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ABSTRACT
Decent housing is not just an aspiration of most
Americans, it is a stated national priority, as well. In
recent years, however, federal subsidies for housing have
decreased while demographic and economic trends have combined
to create a shortage of decent, affordable housing in this
country.
One component of the federally assisted housing stock
consists of private properties receiving subsidies, which
reduce rents to a level affordable to low income households.
These subsidy programs were structured in such a way that the
owners had the option to prepay the mortgages after twenty
years and terminate the use restrictions on the properties.
As the projects begin to reach the twenty year mark, housing
advocates fear a wave of prepayments that would seriously
reduce the assisted housing stock. In reaction to this
concern, Congress enacted legislation which effectively
prevents prepayment for two years while it seeks a more
permanent solution.
The study considers this legislation from the perspective
of a private owner. It examines the curtailment of property
rights and sets forth a framework by which owners can evaluate
alternative courses of action and assess the subjective
elements of the decisions facing them. An informal survey of
project owners and other interested parties revealed that, to
date, owners are taking a "wait and see" stance with respect
to the issue. Also, none reported using any rigorous analysis
in addressing the situation thus far. The study concludes
with a set of findings, and some recommendations to the
parties involved in this issue.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Wheeler
Title: Visiting Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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Chapter I: INTRODUCTION
Adequate shelter is one of the central tenets of the
"American Dream," and, as a whole, Americans are the best
housed people in the world. 1 Nonetheless, many people still
have not attained the stated national goal, set forth in the
1949 Housing Act, of "a decent home and a suitable living
environment."
Overview of the Problem
Despite the improvement in the general quality level of
the housing stock over the past several decades, millions of
households reside in substandard dwellings. Millions more
spend an exhorbitant percentage of their incomes to put a roof
over their heads. Many inner city neighborhoods are unfit for
human habitation regardless of the condition or affordability
of individual dwellings. Finally, homelessness appears to be
a growing problem, and now includes families as well as the
more traditional "street people."
These problems are more interrelated and complex than
they might appear at first glance. Substandard dwellings,
affordability and homelessness are affected by both the size
of the housing stock in a given area (supply), and by the
effective demand of the households (i.e., their ability to
command housing resources in the market, as opposed to their
4
needs or desires). The problems of homelessness and
neighborhood environment also include social dimensions such
as substance abuse, crime and mental health considerations.
Finally, it is important to note that housing markets (and
submarkets) are very localized, and influenced by both the
macro and micro-economies.
Given the scope of these problems and the number of
people affected by them, it is understandable that there has
recently been a renewed interest in housing policy, after
eight years of retrenchment during the Reagan administration.2
One area of investigation, and the point of departure for this
study, involves the stock of federally subsidized rental
housing for low and moderate income households. More
specifically, this paper addresses concerns that this stock
may be seriously reduced in size over the next few years.
At present the federal government provides rental
assistance, in one form or another, to more than four million
households. Many people do not realize, however, that
publicly owned housing ("public housing") accounts for only
one-third of these units.3 The majority of cases involve a
partnership with the private housing market whereby federal
subsidies make privately owned rental units affordable to low
and moderate income households. Through a variety of programs
with cryptic titles (e.g., Section 8, Section 221 (d)(3) and
FaHA 515) the buildings (unit-based approach) and/or the
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residents (tenant-based strategy) are subsidized to the extent
that low and moderate income households can afford decent
dwellings. Since the government actually owns the public
housing projects, those units can be considered a "permanent"
resource. In contrast, the privately-owned, federally
subsidized units are "leased," and this resource must be
recognized as "temporary" in nature.
Under most unit-based programs a contractual agreement
was reached whereby the private owner/developer was offered a
variety of inducements to participate in the program. In
return, he had to agree to certain restrictions concerning the
use of the premises. Typical inducements included interest
subsidies, loan guarantees, and long term (40 years)
mortgages. Customary restrictions would include using the
property to house eligible low and moderate income persons,
and acceptance of a rent schedule that provided for a limited
return on equity (generally 6%).
Given the limited cash flow from the properties,
favorable tax treatment of these developments was an important
factor in encouraging private sector participation. Another
key provision that proved necessary to attract entrepreneurs
was the option to prepay the remaining mortgage balance after
20 years, thereby freeing the property from use restrictions. 4
By prepaying, an owner effectly "opts-out" of the
program, and thus removes previously subsidized units from the
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stock. Now that many of the projects developed under these
programs are approaching the twenty year point, housing
advocates are fearful that a wave of prepayments will
seriously reduce the size of the assisted rental stock.
The removal of units from the programs as a result of
mortgage prepayments (with the attendant expiration of use
restrictions -- "EUR") may be compounded by the concurrent
expiration of certain tenant subsidy programs. Over time, it
became evident that even with the unit-based subsidies, rents
were often still too high to reach very low income households.
For that reason, tenant-based subsidies were extended, as
well, whereby the federal government paid the difference
between the necessary rent to sustain the project and a set
percentage of the households' incomes.5 These subsidy
programs were established for finite periods (often 15 years),
and as they begin to expire, the tenants they assist may be
displaced and/or the projects they support may be at risk of
default. The National Low Income Housing Preservation
Commission (the "Commission") has estimated that the
combination of prepayment and default could reduce the
privately owned stock of federally subsidized dwellings by
80 per cent over the next fifteen years.6 The Commission's
report will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
The early unit-based subsidy programs were created in the
1960's, and rose to prominence during President Johnson's
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"Great Society." The Kaiser Commission challenged the nation
to "solve" the low income housing problem in a decade, and the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 sought to do just
that, calling for the development of an average of 600,000
federally subsidized housing units per year for 10 years. To
achieve that level of production, at a price the country could
afford, the Johnson Administration knew that it would be
necessary to tap the resources of the private sector. A
profit motive would be required, even if it had a 20 year time
horizon attached to it.
According to those involved at the time, the emphasis was
on the production of housing, not on what might happen twenty
years in the future. Morton Schomer, Assistant FHA Commission
during that period, recently stated that "although it is easy
to say we should have foreseen this problem [prepayments), I
can only say that our goal was to involve the private sector
and to provide subsidized housing for families in need of
assistance."8  In evaluating the programs he helped devise,
Henry Schecter, former HUD official, is even more blunt. "The
idea of depending on private enterprise to develop low-income
housing turns out to be a fool's paradise in the end . . . it
was a mistake."9  A more optimistic assessment would be to
acknowledge the inherent tradeoff that faced the
Administration -- for any level of resources that could be
committed to housing, more units could be developed
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(initially) through the unit-based subsidies than could be
built directly through the public housing program.
Now, however, the days of reckoning are arriving, and a
great deal of concern (and rhetoric) is being expressed over
the "grave national crisis in the supply of low income
housing."1 0 Current demographic and economic trends have
combined to create a situation in which there are more
households in need of assistance than when these programs were
originally created. Although a greater percentage of
households are receiving assistance in one form or another
than was the case twenty years ago, the absolute number in
need has increased, and fewer than 3 out of 10 eligible
households are recipients of these programs. 1
The question of an appropriate response to this issue of
the expiring use restrictions has received a good deal of
(belated) attention from the federal government and some of
the states which will be most heavily impacted. As noted
by the former Administration officials, hindsight has shown
the weakness of the existing programs. Such hindsight may
prove instructive in designing future programs, but it does
little to resolve the current situation with private owners
desiring to prepay their mortgages and advocates trying to
preserve the stock of affordable housing units.
It appears that the federal government's options are
rather limited. When the mortgages were originally signed,
9
the owners were granted the option to prepay and exit from the
programs after twenty years. It seems difficult for the
government to defend a retroactive action which now restricts
that option, to the detriment of the owners. An additional
stumbling block is that of the federal deficit. Even if the
government decided that it was appropriate to "buy" its way
out of this situation, the budgetary tradeoffs that would be
necessary would surely be painful and controversial. The
Commission estimates that it would require, on average, more
than one billion dollars per year to preserve the existing
inventory of "at risk" projects for the next fifteen years.13
In a last-minute piece of legislation before the Christmas
recess this issue was partially addressed in Title II of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 (HCDA '87).
Title II is described as an interim response to an "emergency"
situation, and it essentially offers additional incentives
to owners who are willing to continue under use restrictions
for the remainder of their mortgage terms. In addition, it
imposes the requirement of approval by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) before those other owners
wishing to prepay may do so. The Secretary of HUD, in turn,
may only approve the requests if the owners can demonstrate
that such action will not have any negative effect on existing
tenants and/or the local supply of affordable housing. These
requirements may be impossible to satisfy in many cases.
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Sponsors contend that the legislation is necessary to
avoid the irreplaceable loss of low income housing, and that
it "balances" the interests of owners and tenants. Critics
characterize the legislation as a unilateral abrogation of
contractual rights and assert that it is illegal.
Organization of the Study
Although this paper acknowledges the serious shortage of
decent, affordable housing for low and moderate income
persons, and the legal considerations raised by the HCDA '87,
these policy issues are not the primary focus of this study.
Instead, this paper looks at the effect of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1987 on privately owned,
federally assisted housing developments from the perspective
of the private investor. It identifies alternative courses
of action available to owners of projects which are nearing
the twentieth year of their mortgages. It then develops a
framework for assessing the financial implications of the
alternatives and compares this stategy with those being
employed by some actual project owners in Massachusetts.
Chapter II expands upon the issues raised in this
Introduction, and includes an examination of the federally
subsidized housing stock; a discussion of the expiring use
restrictions and subsidy payments; potential strategies to
preserve the housing stock from prepayment and/or default; a
11
review of the relevant sections of Title II of the HCDA '87;
and a look at the current status of the housing stock in
question.
This background discussion establishes the foundation for
Chapter III, which presents a framework for evaluating various
financial options under conditions of uncertainty.
Specifically, a number of determinants of value (including the
HCDA '87) are discussed, and "decision theory" is employed to
develop a structure from which to evaluate the financial
alternatives. Finally, a number of owners of actual projects
are surveyed to see how they are addressing these issues, and
to compare and contrast that approach with the one presented
in the chapter.
Chapter IV concludes this study by summarizing the major
findings and offering a set of recommendations to the various
parties involved in this issue.
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Chapter II: BACKGROUND ON EXPIRING USE CONDITIONS
In April 1987 the U.S. Congress created the National Low
Income Housing Preservation Commission to study the issues
surrounding the stock of privately owned, but federally
subsidized rental housing units. The Commission investigated
four specific points:1 5
1. To estimate the magnitude of loss of the
subsidized stock as low income housing and the causes
of the loss;
2. To examine alternative ways to minimize this
loss;
3. To recommend ways to mitigate the negative
effects of any losses on low income households; and
4. To analyze the cost of alternative solutions.
The Commission presented its findings a year later (after
the passage of the HCDA '87) in a report entitled Preventing
the Disappearance of Low Income Housing. This chapter
examines those findings, with particular emphasis on the issue
of mortgage prepayment and the subsequent expiration of the
use restrictions on the previously subsidized housing stock.
Federally Assisted Rental Housing Opportunities
Exhibit 1 provides a graphic breakdown illustrating the
components of the universe of the federally subsidized housing
stock. Of the 4,163,000 subsidized units, only one-third are
publicly owned (conventional public housing). Another 20
13
EXHIBIT 1
Composition of Subsidized Housing
Section 8
ExistingNouchers
813,000 /
Universe of Subsidized Housing
Public Housing
Nx 1,400,000
Privately Owned,
Subsidized Housing
1,950,000
Privately Owned, Subsidized Housing
Other
165,000
FmHA 515
305,000
Preservation
Analysis Inventory
645,000
Section 8 New/Rehab
840,000
Preservation Analysis Inventory
221(d)(3) BMIR
159,000 /
Assisted 221 (d)(3)
Market Rate
80,000
Section 236 Program
406,000
Source: National Low Income Housing Preservation Commission Tabulations. HUD Data.
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percent of the subsidized housing opportunities represent
cases in which eligible tenant households are provided with
direct rent subsidies which enable them to afford market rate
housing in the private market. Slightly less than one-half
the units are privately owned, but provided with federal
subsidies of one form or another which makes the dwellings
affordable to low and moderate income households. It can be
seen, therefore, that the federal government maintains direct
(public housing) or indirect (Section 8 Existing/Vouchers)
control over one-half the universe of subsidized housing, as
long as it continues to fund those programs.
On the other hand, the government's position with respect
to the remaining half of the inventory is that of a partner
with the private sector. The long run viability of this
partnership depends upon a mutually beneficial relationship
between the parties. Given the contractual relationship under
which these programs were originally structured, not only must
the federal government continue to fund these programs, but
the private owners/investors must deem it to be in their best
interest to remain involved in these programs rather than to
"opt-out" (at certain specified points) and use the properties
for some private market use.
Of the privately owned, subsidized housing component,
one-third (645,000 units) is comprised of units assisted via
the Section 236 and Section 221 (d) (3) programs. They are
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referred to in Exhibit 1 as the "Preservation Analysis
Inventory" (PAI). These units are the focus of recent debate
and legislation, only because of the perceived urgency in
dealing with the dwellings supported by these programs. The
Section 8 New/Rehab, FmHA 515, and "other" units face the same
basic problems, but not as soon as the PAI.16
The Expiration of Use Restrictions and Subsidy Payments
The Preservation Analysis Inventory is "at risk" because
of two separate factors. As mentioned in the first chapter,
some of the projects have reached the point where the owners
have the option to prepay the mortgage balance and eliminate
the use restrictions associated with the respective programs
(by the end of 1988, approximately 20,000 units will have
passed the twenty year mark). As shown in Exhibit 2, units in
many more projects will reach this point in the next few
years. In the absence of additional "carrots" and/or "sticks"
(base case scenario), the Commission has estimated that 38% of
the units in the PAI will be "lost" in this manner over the
next fifteen years.
An even greater percentage (43%) is at risk of default,
assuming that related federal subsidy programs to, or on
behalf of tenants are allowed to expire as currently
scheduled. Although these units will not be "lost," they do
represent an expensive and time consuming liability for the
16
EXHIBIT 2
Estimated Number of Units within the PAI
Eligible for Prepayment, 1986-2001
70000
60000
50000
40000
Number
of Units 30000
20000
10000
'87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 94 '95 '96 97 98 -99 00 '01
Year
Units in projects Units in projects
with some with no
Section 8 units Section 8 units
Source: James E. Wallace, Abt Associates, Inc., 1987
federal government. When a project owner stops making
mortgage payments the lender usually assigns the property to
HUD, which makes the payments while it works with the owner to
cure the problem. If HUD must foreclose and take over the
ownership of the property, the FHA insurance fund must pay off
the mortgage balance to the lender. HUD must pay operating
expenses during this time, as well as the legal costs
associated with the foreclosure process. Historically, HUD
has had to resell these properties to new owners at a deep
17
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discount in order to put them on reasonable financial footing.
The entire process represents a financial and administrative
burden that HUD would just as soon avoid.17
The Commission's base case estimate is that by the year
2002, the owners of fewer than one unit in five will avoid
default and yet not decide that it is in their best interest
to prepay the mortgage and withdraw from the subsidy programs
(Exhibit 3). Non-profit entities and certain private owners
are restricted from prepaying their mortgages. Of the 122,000
units estimated to remain within the PAI subsidized stock
through the mortgage term, more than two-thirds are owned by
one of these groups.
Exhibit 4 illustrates the dynamics of this process.
Default and prepayment are chronic problems over the next
decade, with prepayment being somewhat more cyclical and
concentrated, due to the timing of when the units were
originally developed and placed under the use restrictions.
The cumulative effect of this process is clearly shown in
Exhibit 5.
Preservation Strategies
In developing these estimates, the Commission developed a
model of the PAI, based on HUD data concerning the physical
and financial status of a sample of the projects, and included
18
EXHIBIT 3
Likely Actions of Owners
Through 2002
Properties
Prepayment
37% /
Continue As Is
Through 2002
16%
Units
Prepayment
38% /
Continue As Is
Through 2002
19%
Source: National Law Income Housing Preservation Commission Preservation
Analysis Model, Weighted Results for 300 Properties.
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Default
k47%
Default
1 43%
EXHIBIT 4
Likely Actions of Owners
by Year of Action
- All Owners -
50,000 t
Rli d
i i B , , , ,, , iiii'88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '9'99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13
E Default
Year
E Operate As Is Through Mortgage Term 0 Prepayment
Source: National Low Income Housing Preservation Commission.
EXHIBIT 5
Number of Units Affected by Cumulative Prepayments,
Cumulative Defaults, Balance Continuing As Is
Number of Units
600,000
500,000 :: :+ :.
400,000
300,000
200,000 . ...
100,000
0
'87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02
Year
A
A
A
-4
.- Continue As Is Default Prepayment
Source: National Low Income Housinq Preservation Commission.
S20
Number
of Units
60,000
40,000-
30,000 -
20,000 -
10,000 -
0 -- -- - - - - - - - -
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local market information from around the country to account
for the variation in housing markets. It also factored in the
impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which undermined the
financial viability of many of these projects, primarily due
to the restrictions placed on the deductibility of "passive"
losses. The model assumes that the owners are rational
economic men and women. Furthermore, in those cases where the
projects have been syndicated, the model recognizes that the
owners have a fiduciary responsibility to maximize the returns
to their investors.
After the base case was run to obtain the estimates
presented above, the Commission tested various preservation
strategies (e.g., extension of subsidy programs, increased
returns to owners and expansion of tax credits) to see how
cost effective (on a discounted present value basis) they
would be. The results of these strategic scenarios are
detailed in the report. They can be summarized as follows:1 8
1. All but the most expensive to save units
could be preserved for an additional 15 years in a
cost effective manner through a combination of
sudsidies and programmatic changes that would avoid
default and prepayment pressures (the cost of this
alternative was compared against the cost of curing
the predicted defaults and offering housing vouchers
to tenants displaced by prepayment and conversion to
market use -- "default/voucher cost").
2. For slightly more than the default/voucher
cost, all of the units could be saved.
3. Saving all of the units would still be much
less expensive than trying to replicate the stock from
scratch.
21
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1987
Although the findings of the Commission are enlightening,
they were not available in time to shape the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1987. Congress enacted this
stop-gap legislation in an effort to "buy time" while a more
permanent solution was devised. The HCDA '87 was included in
a last minute flurry of legislative activity, and the fact
that it passed (and included Title II "Preservation of Low
Income Housing") was a surprise even to some of its strongest
supporters in Congress.1 9
The HCDA '87 imposes a variety of interim measures to
avoid the "irreplaceable loss of low income housing and
irrevocable displacement of current tenants." 2 0 It mandates
that an owner notify the Secretary of HUD and any applicable
state or local government housing agency of his intention to
prepay the mortgage, and that a "Plan of Action" accompany any
such request. The plan must include the following
information:21
1. A description of any proposed changes in the
status or terms of the mortgage or regulatory
agreement.
2. A description of any assistance that could be
provided by state or local government agencies.
3. A description of any proposed changes in the
low income affordability restrictions.
4. A description of any change in ownership that
is related to prepayment.
5. An assessment of the effect of the proposed
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changes on existing tenants.
6. A statement of the effect of the proposed
changes on the supply of housing affordable to lower
and very low income families or persons in the
community within which the housing is located and in
the area that the housing could reasonably be expected
to serve.
7. Any other information that the Secretary
determines is necessary to achieve the purposes of
this title.
An owner has two options under such a plan. He can
either leave the use restrictions intact and request certain
incentives authorized in the legislation (which have not been
adequately funded, to date), or he can request the Secretary
of HUD to approve the prepayment of the mortgage (upon
specific showing that such action will not adversely affect
existing tenants and/or the local supply of affordable
housing), thereby eliminating the use restrictions.
The incentives authorized by the HCDA '87 include:22
1. An increase in the allowable distribution or
other measures to increase the rate of return on
investment.
2. Revisions to the method of calculating
equity.
3. Increased access to residual receipts
accounts or excess replacement reserves.
4. Provision of insurance for a second mortgage
under section 241(f) of the National Housing Act.
5. An increase in the rents permitted under an
existing contract under section 8 of the United States
Housing Act of 1937, or (subject to the availability
of amounts provided in appropriation Acts) additional
assistance under such section 8 or an extension of any
project-based assistance attached to the housing.
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6. Financing of capital improvements under
section 201 of the Housing and Community Development
Amendments of 1978.
7. Other actions, authorized in other provisions
of law, to facilitate a transfer or sale of the
project to a qualified nonprofit organization, limited
equity tenant cooperative, public agency, or other
entity acceptable to the Secretary.
8. Other incentives authorized in law.
The Secretary of HUD may approve such a plan upon finding
that (1) the package of incentives is necessary, (2) it
represents the least costly alternative for the federal
government, (3) binding commitments are in place to ensure
continued usage as low income housing, (4) proper maintenance
will be continued, and (5) existing tenants will be protected
from involuntary displacement and certain rent increases.
Conversely, a plan of action may request the termination
of the use restrictions. In this case, the Secretary must
find that:2 3
1. Implementation of the plan of action will not
materially increase economic hardship for current
tenants or involuntarily displace current tenants
(except for good cause) where comparable and
affordable housing is not readily available, and
2. The supply of vacant, comparable housing is
sufficient to ensure that such prepayment will not
materially affect:
a. The availability of decent, safe, and
sanitary housing affordable to lower income and very
low income families or persons in the area that the
housing could reasonably be expected to serve;
b. The ability of lower income and very
low income families or persons to find affordable,
24
decent, safe, and sanitary housing near employment
opportunities; or
c. The housing opportunities of minorities
in the community within which the housing is located;
or
3. The plan has been approved by the appropriate
state agency and any appropriate local government
agency for the jurisdiction within which the housing
is located as being in accordance with a state
strategy approved by the Secretary.
The effect of these provisions is to encourage
continuation in the programs, and discourage (in reality
prevent) the termination of use restrictions at this time. It
would be most difficult to establish that the termination of
the restrictions would not have any adverse affect,
particularly in a local housing market that would encourage
the move to market usage in the first place.
It is important to note the difference between the
procedure that has been established under this act, and a
typical "impact analysis" such as one modeled after the
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) which only
requires the submission of information. In addition to the
analysis required by the HCDA '87, the law stipulates that the
Secretary of HUD must approve it, and can only do so if no
significant adverse impacts are likely. These requirements
appear to expose an owner to substantive legal challenges as
well as to procedural ones. All of this is now necessary
merely to exercise an agreement that was established twenty
years ago.
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In an attempt to back itself up in case this unilateral
abrogation of contractual rights is invalidated by the courts,
an "alternative prepayment moratorium" is established by which
"an owner of eligible low income housing located in the
geographic area subject to the jurisdiction of such court may
not prepay, and a mortgagee may not accept prepayment of, a
mortgage on such housing during the 2-year period following
the date of such invalidation."24
Although owners may consider these actions to be unfair
(and may mount a legal challenge),25 it is possible that they
will serve their intended purpose (to buy time) even if they
are eventually determined to be illegal. Considering the time
and money it would take to challenge the requirements and
pursue the appeals, individual owners must assess whether they
would be better off trying to work within the system (or just
wait for the "interim" Act to be superceded) rather than to
fight it. Furthermore, there is an obvious imbalance between
the resources the owners could commit to a legal challenge and
those the government could bring to bear on a defense.
The first issue that owners raise is whether the federal
government has the authority to revise unilaterally contracts
to which it is a party. Though conceding that a comparable
case does not exist, an attorney for the Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress concluded that
such an action was "arguably legal" based upon a handful of
26
(more or less) related cases.26 David A. Smith, senior vice
president for a firm that has syndicated many of these
projects, notes that " . . . at least in the minds of
Congress, a contract is not always binding when the Federal
government is one of the parties." 2 7
If the courts ultimately uphold the HCDA '87, the
question is then settled. Rather than defend its actions
"head on," however, the government might try a different
defense. It might argue that the HCDA '87 does not represent
a fundamental revision of the contracts, but rather the
implementation of a mitigation process that has always been
implicit within the agreements. Again, judgment in favor of
the government would leave the owners with little recourse.
Even a finding in favor of the owners might leave the
government with an opportunity to tailor new legislation in
such a way as to "fit" the decision.
The owners do have one "wildcard" that they could try to
play if the HCDA '87 is overturned. Based on the Supreme
Court's decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 55 L.W. 4782 (1987), the
owners could seek damages for a "temporary taking" for the
time that the Act was in effect. It is uncertain whether the
courts would extend the First English decision (a land use
regulation case) to this instance, but there are certain
parallels that the owners could point to.
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These are complex legal issues that await judicial
determination. The "bottom up" nature of the legal process
ensures that the ultimate resolution will not occur soon. In
the meantime, it is clear that the HCDA '87 has put a damper
on the value of the projects and on the likelihood of any
short term concessions by the owners.
Status of the Preservation Analysis Inventory
While there is room for differing opinions with respect
to the specific actions that have been taken concerning the
issue of EUR, several points have been established:
1. Decent, affordable rental units for low and
moderate income households are in short supply in most
parts of this country. The need is greater now, in
absolute terms, than it was twenty years ago when the
programs in question were being developed.
2. The privately owned, federally assisted stock
of dwellings is a valuable resource, albeit one that
has been "leased" rather than purchased by the
government. Given the continuing need for more of
these units, it would seem that incentives, not
punitive measures, are called for in order to preserve
the "partnership" that has already been established.
3. There appears to be a limited range of
long-term solutions to this problem, given the
existing contractual obligations between the parties
and the current budget deficit. Equitable solutions
to the problem will likely be less difficult to find
than will be the funds necessary to implement them.
4. More units are likely to be affected by
default than by prepayment of the mortgages. While
units in defaulting projects will not be "lost" to the
stock of low cost housing (the HCDA '87 mandates that
HUD return the units to the inventory) they will be
expensive to work-out. Historical data show that HUD
loses 60 cents on the dollar when a project it has
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insured goes into default. It would seem to be less
costly, as well as less disruptive to tenants, if the
necessary investments were made to save the projects
from default rather than being spent after the fact.
5. One important consideration that has been
absent from this debate is the fact that most of the
units that are "at risk" of prepayment would still
remain within reach of low and moderate income
households if those tenants wgge to receive vouchers
or similar rental assistance. Based upon the market
data the Commission collected for its model, it
estimated that more than 85% of the units would rent
at or below the prevailing "fair market rents"3 0
established for the Section 8 Existing program
(there would be no guarantee, however, that these
units would remain affordable over the long run).
Although the impact of the potential loss of the
remaining 15% of the units would likely be
concentrated in the tightest housing markets, this
statistic calls into question the true extent of the
"emergency," and the necessity of the harsh "interim"
measures included in the HCDA '87.
Although the HCDA '87 has put the prepayment issue "on
hold," it does not address the underlying problem. Owners are
currently assessing their options (including a possible legal
challenge of the Act), while housing advocates are pressing
their agenda at the state and local levels of government.
Both sides are lobbying Congress to shape the legislation that
will ultimately supercede the HCDA '87. In the meantime, many
of the project owners are content to bide their time while
waiting for events to unfold.
Financial Structure under Conditions of Uncertainty
Given this overview of the Preservation Analysis
Inventory, the remainder of this study considers the financial
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structure of these projects from the perspective of the
private owner/investor. More specifically it analyzes the way
in which uncertainty, caused by the HCDA '87 and other related
factors, affects the owners' assessment of project value.
The inherent uncertainty in this situation renders
conventional approaches to value (e.g., discounted cash flow
analysis) inadequate. Instead, a framework for analyzing the
value of projects based on decision theory is presented. A
representative "decision tree" is constructed and "expected
values" are calculated for the primary operational
alternatives. This theoretical construct is then compared and
contrasted with current practice through a survey of project
owners.
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Chapter III: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING PROJECT VALUE
This chapter considers the effect of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1987 on the financial structure
of privately owned, federally subsidized apartment projects.
It also takes into account the financial effect of several
other factors, as they relate to the HCDA '87.
It was noted in the previous chapter that the
restrictions on prepayment established by the Act have limited
the range of options immediately available to the owners. To
the extent that an owner's "bundle" of property rights has
been diminished, it is reasonable to assume that the current
value of his project has likewise been diminished. This
chapter presents a framework that owners could use to think
about this issue and compares it with the actual strategies,
if any, they are employing to optimize the financial structure
and value of their projects.
The HCDA '87 is not the only factor that affects the
financial viability of these projects. Other important
governmental actions include the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA '86), the status of tenant subsidy programs, and the
imposition of various state and local regulations which
restrict the use of the projects independent of the HCDA '87.
An important nongovernmental factor is the effect of
market conditions on the value of the properties. Although
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these conditions vary greatly between projects, there are some
general characteristics affecting these units that bear
consideration.
Once these background determinants have been introduced,
the chapter then focuses on the use of decision theory as a
framework for analyzing the financial status and potential of
these projects under the conditions of uncertainty created by
the HCDA '87. A "framework" for analysis is deemed to be more
appropriate, and useful, than a "model" would be since the
circumstances surrounding each project are unique. The
following discussion will show that even though the projects
are affected by certain common factors, individual differences
in location, market conditions, physical condition, tenant
mix, state and local regulations, and ownership structure
prevent the development of a specific model that could handle
such a diverse collection of projects.
Tax Reform Act of 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was intended to simplify this
country's tax code, reduce the number of tax brackets, lower
the marginal rates, and close various perceived "loopholes."
In so doing, it has affected the tax treatment of many fields
of investment, including real estate.
Investment in low income housing is no exception, with a
number of provisions affecting privately owned, federally
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subsidized projects. Lengthened depreciation schedules
(without "acceleration" options) reduce the attractiveness of
new investments when compared with the previous tax law.
Lower marginal tax rates reduce the value of tax losses.31
The elimination of preferred treatment of capital gains may
tend to create a disincentive for the outright sale of the
properties, but it has no effect on owners who prepay the
mortgage and take the projects to market rate rents. The Act
does offer certain tax credits for low income housing, but
thus far few owners have taken advantage of them. The
regulations governing the credits are viewed as complex, and
the value of the credits themselves are limited.32
Furthermore, the tax credit program is scheduled to expire in
1989.
The most significant "reform" in the 1986 Act with
respect to real estate investment concerns the definition and
treatment of "passive" income (loss). The Act creates a new
category of income, and defines passive income to include
"income generated from business and trade activities in which
the taxpayer does not materially participate and from rental
activities such as real estate." 33 For individuals,
partnerships, and trusts, losses from passive activities can
be used to offset income from other passive activities, but
not other income (e.g., wages and interest).34 Furthermore,
these provisions are retroactive in the sense that existing
33
investments are subject to the new rules (i.e., no
"grandfather" clause). As noted earlier in this study, the
value of tax losses (at relatively high marginal tax rates)
was an important factor in enticing private sector
participation in the various subsidized housing programs. As
the passive income provisions of the TRA '86 are phased in,
this "value" (and motivating force) is effectively eliminated.
The most obvious effect of the passive income provisions
will be to reduce the returns realized by investors in the
projects. If there are more profitable investments available
for their capital, investors will seek to shift their
investments accordingly (or alternatively, take the projects
to market rents to increase cash flow/income and use the lower
marginal tax rates to their advantage). As noted in the
previous chapter, these projects were, to a large extent, tax
driven deals. Therefore, the TRA '86 has created a
disincentive to remain in the subsidized housing programs, and
encourages owners to prepay their mortgages and either sell or
rent the units at market rates.
A related, although perhaps less obvious effect of the
passive income provisions is to lower the value of the
projects themselves (i.e., lower returns are capitalized into
a lower value). Some investors may not recognize this
initially since the projects have not changed physically, nor
has the rent structure/cash flow been altered. The fact that
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the "rules of the game" have changed, however, overrides those
other factors. 3 5
Expiring Subsidy Programs
In Chapter II it was noted that the scheduled expiration
of certain tenant subsidy programs would seriously affect the
fiscal viability of some projects. Even when the effect is
not great enough to threaten default, the uncertainty
surrounding the subsidy programs and potential for reduced
cash flow creates an incentive for owners to prepay their
mortgages (if possible) and terminate the use restrictions.
Although it is unlikely that the Congress would let the
tenant subsidy programs expire outright, the possibility
exists. Given the federal budget deficit outlook for the next
few years, a more probable scenario could be that any
subsequent program(s) would be less beneficial to the owners
than is the current set. In any case, the uncertainty which
surrounds this issue ultimately affects a project's financial
position in at least two ways. First, it lowers a property's
encumbered value. Conversely, it creates an incentive for
an owner to try to exit from the program and exploit the
project's (higher) unencumbered value.
State and Local Regulations
In addition to the requirements contained in the
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HCDA '87, the privately owned, federally subsidized projects
may also be faced with various state and/or local use
restrictions. These regulations can restrict an owner's
ability to change the nature of a project (e.g., condominium
conversion or anti-displacement laws) or make it a less
profitable/more expensive proposition (e.g., rent control or
mandatory relocation assistance requirements).
Because these types of restrictions vary between
communities and states (and are always subject to change),
this study does not attempt to rigorously examine all the
possible permutations, but they are an important factor. The
more restricted the projects, or the greater the uncertainty
regarding their potential to achieve a market rate use, the
lower the value of the properties, all other things being
equal.
Market Factors
One rather surprising finding of the Commission is its
estimate that 85% of the units at risk of prepayment would
have an unrestricted market rent level at or below the
prevailing "fair market rents" (set by HUD for the Section 8
tenant subsidy program) in the communities in which they are
located. Housing advocates maintain that the actual
percentage would be lower, but acknowledge that the most
serious problems would be concentrated in a relatively few of
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the "tightest" housing markets.36 If further investigation
supports the Commission's conclusion, then claims about the
"emergency" used to justify the HCDA '87 would be undermined.
This assessment of the Commission, nonetheless, is likely
to be correct for a number of reasons. First, the projects
were designed and constructed to program standards intended to
produce apartments with low to moderate rent levels. Although
it would be possible to upgrade finishes and add certain
amenities in order to attract a different market segment, the
constraints imposed by the original designs and quality of
construction will place a practical limit as to what can
realistically be done. The age of the units is a second
limiting factor. None of the units will leave the program
before they are at least twenty years old. Even after
renovation they will not be "new;" yet none are old enough to
be considered "quaint," either.
Location of a project is critical to its market
potential. Although there are (widely cited) instances where
projects are located in neighborhoods that have gentrified, or
formerly rural sites which are now fashionably suburban, these
are the exceptions and not the rule.37 Much more common are
projects that were located originally in low to moderate
income neighborhoods that have maintained the status quo or
even declined in desirability.
The physical condition of the projects is another
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limiting factor. Some projects have been reasonably well
maintained over the years, while others have not. Regardless
of the owners' intentions, HUD purposely designed a "thin"
reserve structure in order to keep the general rent levels as
low as possible.38 Thus, funds available for maintenance
have been very limited, and virtually all projects have
significant rehabilitation needs.
Given the interplay among these market factors, there are
probably relatively few instances in which it makes economic
sense to substantially renovate a project and aim for the high
end of the rental or condominium market.
A Framework for Analyzing the Value of the Proiects
As the owners of private, federally subsidized apartments
contemplate the futures of their projects, they face a choice
among three basic alternatives.3 9 They may decide to stay in
the program, in which case they can seek the incentives
offered under the HCDA '87. The downside to this choice is
that the owners would still realize relatively limited returns
on their investments. Moreover, the uncertainty of what will
happen with the tenant subsidy programs over the next few
years remains. A second alternative (the "wholesale" option)
would be to sell the properties now. This market would be
limited to entities willing to keep the projects as low income
housing (most likely non-profit organizations), or to entities
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willing to accept the uncertainties and risks from which the
owners are wanting to escape. In either case such a sale
would be on a "distressed property basis," and the current
owners would forego most of the upside potential of the
projects. A final alternative would be to prepare a plan of
action which requests prepayment approval and, if granted,
offer the project on the unsubsidized market (the "retail"
option). This could take the form of market rate rentals, or
sale via condominium conversion. These subsequent decisions
would be influenced by factors such as the local regulatory
climate, tenant relations, and market conditions.
When considering these alternatives, an owner has a
problem obtaining the relevant information needed to make an
informed choice. Much of the "data" is highly uncertain, and
some of it is completely unknowable. For example, incentives
to stay in the program (assuming they are funded) are
negotiated on a case-by-case basis, so an owner cannot know in
advance what kind of deal will ultimately be struck with HUD.
Likewise, the prospects of prepayment approval are highly
uncertain, particularly in those locations that offer the best
market opportunities.
Once an owner has collected the best information
available he still faces the problem of how actually to frame
the choice. In the simplest of cases, an owner could make his
best estimate of the net cash flow, tax benefits/liabilities,
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and residual value of the project over the anticipated holding
period for each alternative, discount these figures to a
present value, and calculate a measure of return for each
(e.g., NPV, IRR, ROE, ROI, etc.).
Unfortunately, this case is not so straightforward: the
uncertainty surrounding the tenant subsidy programs makes it
difficult to predict cash flow figures; the TRA '86
substantially diminished the tax benefits for these projects;
and the various regulatory hurdles (e.g., HCDA '87, and state
and local restrictions) raise questions concerning the
ultimate residual value of the properties. The affected
owners are operating in a highly uncertain, ever-changing
environment. The question arises of whether there are any
alternatives to reliance on "gut feelings" and rules of thumb.
There are certain "decision theories" that can be helpful
to a decision maker in such a case. None can eliminate or
sidestep the inherent uncertainties of the situation, but they
can provide a coherent process which at least identifies one's
subjective assessments of the problem. To begin, we will
consider three possible scenarios facing an owner, and the
implications of each. To analyze these options (and potential
variations) it is useful to construct a "decision tree" and to
assess the "expected value" of alternative outcomes. A
decision tree is a graphic representation of the choice(s) to
be made. By including estimates of potential outcomes and the
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probabilities of each, it is possible to calculate a weighted
average which represents the expected value (EV) of each
"branch" of the tree. In reviewing this tree and the examples
which follow, one should not become fixated on the specific
numbers. The concepts underlying the technique are what is
important.
In the best case scenario, we assume the owner receives
prompt prepayment approval without having to make concessions.
With the termination of the program use restrictions, such an
owner can sell the property or hold it for rental in the
unsubsidized market (to a particular market segment).
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In deciding whether to rent or sell the property, the
owner would calculate the EV of each option. In considering
the value of the rental option, the owner might want to
evaluate a range of rents which would vary depending upon the
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market segments he might target. He would estimate the rents
(high, middle, low), the renovation costs for each market,
factor in the cost of refinancing and other expenses, and then
capitalize the net operating income. He would also have to
estimate the probabilities of successfully reaching each
market segment. In this example, we are assuming that the
owner believes there is just a 10% probability of being able
to attract high-end renters to this property. There is a
strong likelihood (60%) that he can obtain middle market
rents, and only a 30% chance that he would have to settle for
the low-end market. By calculating the weighted average of
these outcomes he obtains an EV of $45,700 for this option.
A similar approach would be taken for the "sell" option.
The owner would estimate the final market value, the cost of
rehabilitation/amenities, the outstanding debt and market
risk. In this case the owner thinks that the most he could
net would be $50,000 and that such an outcome has a 40%
probability. In considering market risk, he anticipates that
he can net at least $45,000 and that this is the more likely
outcome (60%). The EV of this "branch" is $47,000 and would
be his preferred outcome.
A middle case scenario might consist of eventual
prepayment approval, but with delays and concessions. In this
instance, the same basic method would be used to value the
"rent" and "sell" options, but the costs of the delay and
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concessions would have to be figured in. The following tree
presents this scenario.
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For the purposes of this example, we have assumed that
under the rental option the concession is that the potential
high-end market alternative is foregone (note that the
probability of the middle market outcome is now 70%).
Furthermore, the delay in this case reduces the present value
of the remaining capitalized values by $1,000. Under the
"sell" option the concessions cost the equivalent of $10,000
per unit and the delay reduces the probability of reaching
the high end of the market range (due to an assumed softening
of the market). The EV for the rental option is now $43,200
and the sell option has an EV of $36,000. In this scenario
the rental option is preferred.
In the worst case situation, prepayment approval by HUD
would be denied. In that instance the rental option would
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consist of continuing to operate "as is" (we assume that HUD
would not offer incentives at that point). There would still
be a "sell" option, but the owner believes it would be
devalued (to a point of equivalency with the "rent as is"
option) as a result of the denial. He feels as though he
could sell to either a non-profit entity concerned with
maintaining the units as affordable housing, or to a
"converter" -- an entity willing to purchase the encumbered
property at a deep discount with the outside possibility of
eventually being able to prepay the mortgage and terminate the
use restrictions.
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This brief look at a range of simplified scenarios
illustrates several important points. First, it emphasizes
the decision maker's (i.e., owner's) need for relevant
information, as well as the need to make certain explicit
assumptions. Some factors are determinable, some are
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probable, and some are completely uncertain. The exercise of
creating a decision tree forces the decision maker to identify
these items and allows him to treat them consistently across
scenarios.
Next, this technique enables an owner to conduct
sensitivity analysis on the variables, even though not all of
them can be quantified with certainty. As long as the other
items are held constant, individual variables can be altered,
and the results will be comparable from case to case.
Using the "best case" scenario as an example, assume that
the owner is concerned that the condominium market might "go
sour" by the time he can rehabilitate and market the units.
If the anticipated prices of the two "sell" outcomes fall by
$5,000 should the owner still convert or should he hold the
project for rental? By recalculating the EV of the sell
option he can see that it has fallen to $42,000, and now the
rental option ($45,700) would be preferred, assuming the
forces that pushed the condo prices down have not affected
the rental market.
In similar fashion, assume that he feels his estimates
for his "sell option" are still valid, but due to signs of
gentrification in the area he believes there is a 40%
probability of attracting "high-end" renters to the project, a
50% chance of medium market rents and only a 10% likelihood of
a low market outcome. The EV of the rental option rises to
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$51,400, thus surpassing that of the sell option ($47,000).
Finally, and perhaps most important, from the sensitivity
analysis it is possible to determine the "bargaining margin"
available in a given situation.40 Again, it is helpful to use
the previous scenarios for an example. The EV of the worst
case (denial) was $25,000 per unit. The EV of the rental
option of the middle case (approval, but with delays and
concessions) was $43,200; a per unit difference of $18,200.
If we assume the project consists of 200 units, then the owner
would have a range of more than $3.5 million in which he could
negotiate concessions,41 if necessary, in order to obtain
approval to prepay the mortgage and take the property to a
market rate. The greater the concession, of course, the less
the incentive to sell.
It is worth considering the strategic significance of
this type of analysis to housing advocates, as well. For
example, HUD could estimate a project's "sell" and "hold"
options in the same manner as an owner. While the estimates
would not be exactly the same, it is likely that they would be
reasonably close. HUD might even be able to make a better
prediction of outcome probabilities than an owner if it
maintained control over some of the outcomes (e.g., it could
give a very accurate "estimate" of the probability of
prepayment approval). It could then calculate the EVs and
estimate the bargaining range. This would be very valuable
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information to have in advance of a negotiating session. As
we will discuss below, about the only thing one party cannot
"know" about another party is that person's attitude toward
the risks in a deal.
The calculation of expected values is but one technique
to weigh options. One criticism of the EV technique is that
it assumes all people are neutral to risk, and thereby make
decisions solely on an economic basis. Before we examine a
more realistic (complex) decision tree modeled after an
owner's current choices, it is useful to introduce another
valuation technique that better handles varying risk appetites
and subjective assessments of uncertain situations.
The concept of "certain monetary equivalents" (CME) is a
derivative of economic utility theory, which allows decision
makers to assess their own subjective feelings with respect to
risky situations.4 3 CME takes into account the "diminishing
marginal utility of money" and the risk aversion that most
people experience related to it. By "forcing" a decision
maker to establish his "indifference point" regarding an
uncertain outcome and a certain monetary equivalent, CME
enables a person to value (albeit subjectively) risky
situations. The difference between a calculated EV and a
person's CME represents the particular risk premium that
person expects from a deal. It must be stressed that this
methodology does not eliminate subjectivity; instead, it makes
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it explicitly personal and internally consistent to a specific
decision maker.
As noted earlier in this discussion, people have
different attitudes toward, and appetites for risk (which also
vary from case-to-case, and over time). It is not possible to
predict how a person will respond to risk in a specific
situation. A person with a generally optimistic outlook will
likely assign different probability values in a decision tree
than would someone who was generally a pessimist. This does
not mean, however, that the optimist would necessarily be less
risk averse than the pessimist when confronted with a choice
where the probabilities were established (or agreed upon).
These are two different facets of the issue, and they account
for much of the subjectivity that is inherent in the decision
making process.
With these concepts in mind, we now consider a more
realistic decision tree which incorporates the three basic
alternatives available to an owner (stay in the program, sell
now, or seek approval to prepay the mortgage). The tree also
incorporates the three scenarios discussed above (and adds
some others), and for the sake of consistency it uses the same
hypothetical values set forth earlier. Once again, it is
important not to focus solely on the numbers or even the
assumptions behind this example. Though they are meant to be
reasonable and build on the earlier examples, in an actual
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case each decision maker would have his own unique set of
variables that could be incorporated into this framework.
Before we begin the analysis of the tree itself, two
points should be noted concerning the exercise of creating it.
First, just by getting the tree and the estimated numbers
associated with it down on paper, the owner has a much better
grasp of the decision to be made. It is doubtful that anyone
could effectively visualize and compute this structure in his
mind. Second, it should be emphasized that this is still a
relatively simple tree. Most of the choice and chance nodes
are binary. This does not have to be the case. It is
entirely conceivable that many of the nodes could have three
or more branches, and although it would lengthen the time
needed to make the calculations, it would not actually
complicate the inherent structure of the process.
We can begin the analysis of the tree by considering the
owner's option to stay in the program. We have assumed that
if he does nothing, the capitalized value of his property is
$25,000 per unit. If he wants to, he is free to seek
incentives under the HCDA '87 and renegotiate his deal with
HUD. The owner estimates there is an 80% probability of
obtaining incentives that would increase his net unit value to
$30,000. For the sake of argument, let us assume that there
is a 20% probability that the negotiations would leave him in
a worse position ($20,000) than he is in currently. If there
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are 200 units in the project, the owner is looking at a
potential swing in value of $2,000,000. What should he do?
The expected value of the "incentive" option is $28,000
per unit -- a significant increase over the "do nothing"
option. Remember, however, that the owner believes the
"payoff" of the incentive option will be either $30,000 or
$20,000, not the calculated EV figure. Recognizing that he
has a 4 out of 5 chance to gain the valuable incentives, he
decides he should favor that course of action (if he
ultimately decides to stay in the program), but he
subjectively "devalues" the EV to a personal CME of $26,500.
His next alternative is to sell now, subject to the
encumberances of the HCDA '87. He believes that he could get
$28,000 per unit from either a non-profit entity or a
"converter" (he may already have an offer at that price).
There is no real risk in this alternative (in his mind), and
so the EV of the deal and his CME are both $28,000. Note that
even though both of the first two alternatives have the same
EV, the owner prefers the "sell now" case because it is "risk
free," and therefore, has the higher CME.
The third option, to seek approval to prepay the mortgage
(and obtain any necessary state or local approvals) , is by
far the most complex, and represents a continuum of outcomes
that encompasses the three scenarios discussed above. Assume
that the owner estimates an 85% probability that his request
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will be denied (worst case scenario) for the foreseeable
future. He could continue to operate his property "as is" and
be no worse off than at present. As noted earlier, he
believes he could still sell the property at that point, but
that the price would only be equal to the rental value.
Therefore, he assesses both the EV and the CME of these
outcomes to be $25,000 per unit.
If his request is approved (by all relevant agencies),
the owner estimates that this would probably happen only after
a significant delay (75% chance). He also believes that there
is a 90% chance that he would be required to make concessions
in order to obtain the approval (middle case scenario). His
sell and rent options are valued as discussed earlier, with
his sell option having an EV of $36,000 and the rental option
EV being $43,200 (preferred). When he calculates the branch
representing approval with delay but without concessions (10%
probability) his sell option EV is $46,000 (preferred outcome)
and the rental option EV is $44,700.
Combining the preferred outcomes of the concession/no
concession branches of the "approval with delay case," the EV
is calculated to be $43,480.
The owner next considers the possibility of approval
without delay (25% probability) and with concessions (80%) or
without concessions (20%). In the best case scenario
(approval without delay or concessions) the EV of the sell
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option is $47,000 (preferred) and the EV of the rental option
is $45,700. If concessions are required, the EVs drop to
$37,000 for the sell option and $44,200 for the rental option
(preferred). The combined concession/no concession EV for
this branch is $44,760.
Reducing the calculation further, the EV for the approval
outcome is $43,800. When this is combined with the EV of
$25,000 for the denial outcome, the overall EV for seeking
prepayment approval is calculated to be $27,820 per unit.
The owner can can now consider the basic alternatives on
an equivalent basis. The expected values of the three courses
of action are almost identical: $28,000 to stay in the
program; $28,000 to sell now; and $27,820 to seek approval to
prepay the mortgage. The owner has already decided he prefers
the "sell now" alternative to staying in the program because
of the risk factor. How does he evaluate selling now versus
seeking approval to prepay?
There is no easy or definitive answer. A risk averse
individual would likely take the "certain" $28,000 per unit by
selling now, and feel good that the respective EVs "justified"
his decision. Someone with a greater risk appetite (whether
by temperment or circumstance) might make the opposite
decision. Such a person would recognize that this framework
is as much an art as it is a science, and begin to explore
some of the assumptions in it.
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By pursuing prepayment approval, the owner is exposing
himself to the high probability that he will "lose" $3,000 per
unit compared with the "sell now" alternative. In a 200 unit
project that amounts to $600,000. On the other hand, the
owner might reason that even if his request is denied he is
really no worse off than he is at present ($25,000 per unit).
If he can get over the approval "hurdle," the EV of the
remaining branch is nearly $44,000 per unit. This would give
him a large bargaining margin should he decide to take a
proactive stance with respect to the negotiation process. By
offering certain concessions, he might be able to improve the
probability of approval and create a "win-win" situation.
It is worth repeating that one must not read too much
into this set of particular numbers. The framework and
thought process are important, not the hypothetical figures
presented in the example. As with the simpler scenarios,
sensivity analysis could be performed on the variables. In
fact, with the appropriate software (e.g., Lotus) a decision
tree could be computerized, greatly simplifying the
manipulation of it.
This framework will not "tell" an owner what to do. It
does assist him in conceptualizing the problem, however, and
it allows him to address the subjective elements of such a
decision. This, in itself, is no small accomplishment.
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Owners' Assessment of Project Value
Now that one method to evaluate alternative courses of
action has been presented, we will consider what some owners
and other interested parties have actually done, to date, with
respect to this issue. This section is based upon interviews
with a number of owners and other parties who have an interest
in assessing the value of projects in the current uncertain
environment. Although this is not a scientific sample, it
represents the collective thoughts of a number of people
having various viewpoints on the issue. In as much as
Massachusetts is one of the states most likely to be affected
by the prepayment issue, what happens here could be indicative
of what will ultimately occur in other places across the
country.
The primary finding of these interviews is that thus far
not as much has happened in this area as had been anticipated.
This finding was foreshadowed by some early interviews with
various interested observers. Phillip Clay raised the
question of "What is an equitable settlement?" He did not
feel that the eventual outcome would represent either extreme
of (1) unrestricted conversion or (2) mandatory retention of
use restrictions. He felt the projects would be negotiated on
a case-by-case basis, but again questioned at what price the
compromises would be struck.4 5 James Spencer and Langley
Keyes both talked about the tradeoffs that would have to be
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negotiated, and like Clay, asked the questions "What to settle
for? . . . Who gets what?" 4 6
A person who assisted a non-profit agency in the recent
purchase of a project from a private owner offered some
insights into the negotiations that took place in that
instance. The owner's asking price was $90,000 per unit,
which was essentially what the units would have retailed for
as condominiums after major renovation. The agency made a
counteroffer of $37,500 per unit which represented the most
that could be paid if the project was to remain affordable to
the income group represented by the current tenants. The deal
was finally made at $47,500 after the state provided a subsidy
of $10,000 per unit. The spokesman said that the state seems
willing to help subsidize such purchases as long as the sales
price does not exceed 60% of unrestricted market value. He
also noted that "converters" in New York City generally pay
between 50%-60% of unrestricted market value for projects.
The deep discount is demanded in order to compensate
converters for the hassles and risks they assume. In the
local case the price seemed to be set by the use of rules of
thumb and external factors rather than by any explicit
analysis of the project itself. The fact that the agency
now wonders if the seller would have settled for less
illustrates the need for more explicit analysis.
Although many projects in Massachusetts will be reaching
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the twenty year mark in the next few years, only twelve have
so far. Of these, seven are held by owners who have indicated
that they are willing to remain in the programs if the
incentives offered under the terms of the HCDA '87 actually
materialize. Three other projects (under one ownership) have
been prepaid, though prior to the enactment of the HCDA '87
and thus not directly affected by it. As it turned out, the
owner of these three projects has a longstanding interest in
affordable housing, and has structured the properties so that
they will operate as mixed income developments. The owners of
the two remaining projects appear to be biding their time,
waiting to see what becomes of the HCDA '87 or its successor
legislation.
There are nine additional projects in the state that will
reach the twenty year mark prior to the scheduled expiration
of the HCDA '87. At least four of these are again owned by
parties who have indicated they intend to remain in the
subsidized programs. The other four owners (one person owns
two of the projects) are taking a wait and see attitude. As
was noted earlier, the prepayment option was designed to take
effect after twenty years, but the owner is not obligated to
act at that time. One owner stated, in confidence, that he
expected the replacement legislation to be more favorable, and
was not interested in trying to prepay under the terms of the
current Act. As he put it, "After twenty years, what's
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another few months?"
When questioned about how they thought about these
decisions, the owners admitted they were not very analytical.
Reasons for this included the fact that the profit in these
deals, to this point, had consisted primarily of tax benefits.
If they had to wait a bit longer on the residual, they would
(grudgingly) do it. One owner of a Boston project noted that
the state and local restrictions were at least as "onerous" as
the provisions of the HCDA '87, and indicated he would
probably remain in the program and seek the incentives
authorized in the Act.
out of this small group, none of the owners contacted
used any formal decision theory in considering their options,
although two seemed to think that it could be useful to them.
It would be interesting to work directly with an owner to
"flesh out" a decision tree and then use his experience to
manipulate different variables. Given the regulatory climate
in Massachusetts, and the Boston area in particular, this
could be a useful exercise even if the terms of the HCDA '87
are relaxed.
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Chapter IV: CONCLUSION
A number of factors led to the passage of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1987. After eight years of
federal retrenchment (and the prospect of a new
Administration), there is a renewed interest in and concern
over the serious shortage of decent, affordable housing for
low income households in this country. Fearing the loss of a
significant component of the assisted housing stock, Congress
included Title II of the Act which essentially prevents the
prepayment of mortgages and the termination of use
restrictions on certain privately owned but federally
subsidized housing projects. These interim provisions are
meant to be temporary while Congress seeks a permanent
solution. In the meantime, owners are deprived of a right
they believe was part of the bargain when they produced these
housing resources twenty years ago.
This apparent diminution of property rights and the
current uncertainty surrounding the entire problem has
affected the financial structure and value of the existing
housing projects. This study has explored these issues and
presented a framework by which owners can evaluate alternative
courses of action and make subjective assessments of project
value. This framework is in contrast to the more intuitive
approach currently being used by many owners.
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Findings
Title II of the Housing and Community Development Act of
1987 was passed in response to concerns that a significant
component of the federally assisted housing stock was "at risk
of loss." Subsequent research has cast doubt on the extent of
the "emergency," and the need for such stringent legislation.
The incidence of "loss" through prepayment will likely be much
less than originally anticipated, and will be distributed
unevenly across the nation. The provisions of the HCDA '87
constitute a rather "blunt instrument" to deal with the
problem.
The provisions of the HCDA '87 (and related actions) affect
the financial structure of exisiting projects. The
restriction on prepayment rights diminishes the value of
existing projects, compounding the effect of the provisions of
the TRA '86 and certain state and local regulations. The
uncertainty that surrounds this issue and the forthcoming
legislation also has a negative effect on project value. In
such an environment an owner, as well as housing advocates,
are wondering how to assess these effects on project financial
structure and value.
Decision theory offers a useful alternative to intuition,
rules of thumb and "gut feeling" in these subjective
situations. The construction of a decision tree clarifies
alternative courses of action, identifies assessments of
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probable outcomes, and forces a decision maker to address his
personal subjective attitude toward risk in a given situation.
This type of framework has not been employed explicitly by
those parties who were interviewed, although some expressed
interest in the concept.
Recommendations
Although some housing activists and owners may view the
current situation in terms of "us versus them," it will be
more productive for all parties to take a long term
perspective of the problem and work toward a mutually
acceptable solution. The programs in question are
partnerships between the federal government and the private
sector. Each party has a role(s) to fulfill, and each is
dependent upon each other. This fact should not get lost in
the rhetoric that surrounds the current impasse. In any case
people on both sides of the table need a realistic assessment
of alternatives and their financial outcomes.
Under the terms of these programs, private owners have
the opportunity and the responsibility to produce and manage
an important component of the assisted housing stock. Owners
must realize that although these projects are business
propositions, they represent more than just a potential profit
opportunity. Decent housing is a basic aspiration of most
people, and these projects are a component of a scarce housing
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resource. Owners should recognize the social dimension of
these programs and they should participate in them (now and in
the future) with this understanding. After all, the owners
(as well as their tenants) are beneficiaries of the public
programs and funds. Ideally, part of the owners'
"compensation" is the satisfaction of participating in the
programs.
On the other hand, owners have a right to expect fair
treatment in these programs. To the extent that they perform
a fiduciary role, owners have an obligation to preserve their
property rights, and should challenge any actions they deem to
be unfair. In this regard, they should pursue the test case
of the HCDA '87, and lobby actively to present their
viewpoints on future legislation at all levels of government.
Finally, owners (and other parties, as noted below)
should become more rigorous in their analysis of situations
like this. They should explicitly identify the alternative
courses of action available to them, and seek to evaluate the
subjective, uncertain situations they face. Decision theory
can be useful in such instances, and one framework for
analysis is presented in this study.
Government is the other primary player in this situation,
and each level has certain roles it is best suited to fulfill.
With respect to the HCDA '87, the federal government is the
most prominent public player.
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To preserve the partnership that has been established,
Congress should fund the incentives authorized in the
HCDA '87, so that remaining in these programs becomes a viable
alternative. In conjunction with this, the prohibitions
against prepayment should be removed from the Act, thereby
fulfilling the government's contractual obligations to the
owners (adequately funded incentives should keep 75% - 85% of
the owners in the program 7). Failure to do so will only
prove to be counterproductive in the long run, as the
public/private partnership breaks down due to a lack of trust.
However, Congress should continue its search for fair and
innovative solutions to the shortage of affordable housing.
As a part of this effort, the government should consider the
"life cycle costs" of various forms of assisted housing as
opposed to merely looking at a program's impact on next year's
budget.48 It should also avoid "solutions" that repeat past
mistakes by merely delaying the "day of reckoning."
Finally, the federal government should realize that
although certain housing problems are pervasive across the
country, they vary in scope and intensity by region and
locality, and that "top down" solutions are unlikely to be
either effective or efficient. Its major role should be to
facilitate the creation of solutions (primarily through the
provision of resources) rather than to try to dictate
solutions from Washington, D.C. Furthermore, by removing
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itself as an adversary, the federal government will be in a
much better position to mediate the inevitable conflicts
between lower levels of government and the private sector.
State governments have an important role in identifying
the priority problems within their boundaries and establishing
the flexibility and authority for local governments to
implement specific programs to combat local problems.
Although certain problems will be common to most states (e.g.,
affordability, physical condition of the housing stock, size
of the stock, etc.) the priority of each will vary across the
country.
The state level of government is in a good position to
encourage localities to experiment with innovative approaches
to various housing problems. This encouragement should take
the form of funding resources as well as enabling legislation.
In a similar fashion to the federal government, states should
facilitate/mediate rather than dictate. In certain instances,
the state may also find it appropriate to work in partnership
with local governments to address specific problems.
Although certain housing issues are "national" in scope,
they become, in the end, location-specific problems.
Therefore, it is appropriate that programs to combat these
problems be designed and implemented at the local level of
government. This is not to imply that the state and federal
governments can withdraw from the effort. As noted above,
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they have crucial roles to fulfill with respect to the
provision of funds and legislative authority. 4 The actual
crafting of specific programs, however, should be done through
the local political process, which can bring an appropriate
combination of regulatory power and resources to bear on
site-specific problems.
This is the point that Tom Demery, Assistant Secretary of
Housing (HUD) was making when he testified before
Congressional hearings on the HCDA '87. To the extent that
the negative effects of the expiring use restrictions will be
concentrated in the tightest housing markets, it should be
those affected jurisdictions that respond to the problems5 0
(with adequate support from the federal government).
Final Observations
The subject of expiring use restrictions is a timely one,
and it has been most interesting to research. However, the
fact that it is such a timely issue has had both good and bad
implications for this study. On the positive side, there is a
great deal of current information available on the topic.
Also, many local people are involved in various aspects of it,
and they have been very generous with their knowledge and
their time. On the negative side, various aspects of the
issue are, paradoxically, both "moving targets" and currently
"on hold." By this I mean that the issue is still evolving,
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and yet actors on both sides are biding their time, hoping to
get some feedback before making their next move.
Because of these factors the issue is likely to evolve
slowly, and may not be resolved for some time. Even then, the
same basic issues will surround similar state and local
restraints. For this reason, the general topic seems to
warrant further study. Perhaps a future researcher could work
directly with a project owner to develop an actual decision
tree based upon the framework presented in this report. From
my investigations, I am confident that some owners would be
receptive to an effort of that sort.
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